The impact of WTO accession on China's agricultural sector Xiaolu Wang Agriculture is still very important in China, not only because it provides the major source of food for the people but also because t s stll the major source of ncome for half of the 1.26 bllon people n Chna. In the past half a century, from 1952 to 2000, China experienced rapid industrialisation, and the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 51 per cent to 16 per cent. However, the dfferentaton of the populaton changed far more slowly. Durng the same period, the proportion of rural people in the total population only declined from 85 per cent to 64 per cent, and the proportion of agricultural workers in China's total employment fell from 84 per cent to 50 per cent. The declne n the share of agrcultural workers was faster than the declne n the share of the rural populaton due to rapd rural ndustralsaton (that is, the development of the Township and Village Enterprises sector) during the past two decades. Still, there were 334 million workers in the agrcultural sector n the year 2000.
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From the large disparity between the agricultural share in GDP and the share of agricultural workers in total employment, one can see how low the labour productvty of the agrcultural sector s compared wth other sectors. In year 2000, rural per capita net income was only 2253 yuan (or US$272), which was equivalent to only 36 per cent of the average urban per capta dsposable ncome.
2 Of the total rural per capita net income, agricultural income was 1136 yuan, of which 868 yuan was from farming,
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that is, 50 per cent and 39 per cent of rural net income, respectively. Thanks to the rapd development of the rural non-agrcultural sectors over the past 20 years, non-agricultural activities provided 44 per cent of farmers' ncomes (off-farm wage ncome plus ncome from non-agrcultural household busnesses).
Grain outputs, yields and inputs
Farming remains the main agricultural activity. In 2000, farming accounted for 56 per cent of the gross value of agrcultural output. Gran producton has been the most mportant component of farmng. A rough calculaton usng output and average prces of major gran products shows that n gross value terms total gran output accounted for 65 per cent of farmng and 38 per cent of agricultural output in 1998. China is the largest grain producer n the world wth output rangng n recent years between 460 and 510 mllon tonnes (unprocessed gran). Ths output accounted for over one-fifth of total world grain output (see Table A5 .1).
Grain output has increased significantly since the beginning of agricultural reform in 1978. It was 300 million tonnes in 1978, and reached its highest level to date of 512 million tonnes in 1998 (grain output declined to 462 mllon tonnes n 2000). The large ncrease n gran output can be manly attrbuted to four effects: the market-orented reforms and the adopton of the household responsibility system in the early 1980s; increases in domestc gran prces; techncal progress (for example. development of hybrd rce); and contnued ncreases n nputs.
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Grain output growth was due entirely to increases in yields, as arable land area has been slowly declnng. The nsttutonal reforms and techncal progress made the major contrbutons to ncreases n yelds up untl the mid 1980s, and then these effects gradually diminished. Inputs such as fertilisers, insecticides and irrigation grew faster than output growth during the pre reform period, but rose more slowly than output during the reform period (Wang 2000a) . Still, the intensity of material inputs has reached a hgh level relatve to other major gran producers (see Table A5 .2). The average gran yelds for Chna as a whole reached 4.95 tonnes per hectare (measured by sown areas) in 1998-99, which is significantly higher than in most developng countres and s close to that of ndustralsed countres.
Yield would be much higher measured in terms of cultivated area, because the average multple-croppng rato s usually 1.5 to 1.6. The level of labour ntensty has been one of the hghest among the world's major gran producers (see Table A5 .2). Due to the rapid increases in marginal costs, further increases in yields, although possible, are not likely to increase farmers' ncomes.
Agricultural labour intensity in China, measured by the number of agricultural workers per hectare of arable land, is 59 per cent higher than the world average, twice as high as for Japan, 20 times higher than the UK, Germany, and France, 50 times higher than the US, and 100 times higher than Australa and Canada (Table A5 .2). The cultvated land area n Chna was only 0.39 hectares per farmer in year 2000. Because of the limitation of land area, the marginal product of labour diminished rapidly. The low labour productvty of the agrcultural sector s manly the result of natural lmtatons n the arable land areas and the huge agrcultural populaton.
Transfer of the agricultural labour force
A major challenge to Chna's agrcultural sector s how to shft a substantal part of ts huge labour force to non agrcultural sectors. Because of rapd rural industrialisation, led by the market-oriented reforms of the past 20 years, 100 million rural labourers moved from the agricultural sector to the township and village enterprise (TVE) sector. Total TVE employment was 128 million in 2000. Rural-urban migration was strictly restricted during the pre reform and early reform periods, but has increased rapidly since the late 1980s, partly as a result of the relaxation of the policy and partly as a result of employment pressures due to the slower growth of TVEs. Most rural workers migrating to urban areas have done so without officially changng ther household regstraton status to urban resdents. The number of these people, so-called 'floating labour', is statistically unavailable. Based on data from surveys, however, the author estimates that they were 14 mllon n 1990 and they totalled around 47 mllon n year 2000.
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However, during the period between 1980 and 2000, the total rural labour force increased from 318 to 499 million (they were re-estimated by the author as 347 million and 519 million for 1980 and 2000, respectively), 6 as a result of natural populaton growth. Therefore, in spite of the rapid rural industrialisation and continued urbanisation in the past two decades, the agricultural labour force has increased from 291 million to 334 million (the author's estimations are 317 million and 344 million for the two years, respectively). The growth rate of rural labour has decreased significantly due to the family planning policy and urbanisation, although it still remained postve at 0.9 per cent n the 1990s. 7 The author predcts that the rural labour force will grow at a low rate of 0.2 per cent per year, to reach a total of 530 million in 2010.
While the natural growth of rural labour is slowing, rural industrialisation has also stagnated since the mid 1990s. Total employment in the TVE sector grew at an annual rate of 12 per cent in the 1980s, but at only 3 per cent in the 1990s. TVE employment reached its highest level of 135 million in 1996, fell in 1996 and 1997, and slightly recovered to 128 million in 2000. There seems no reason to believe that employment growth in the TVE sector wll recover n the medum term. We therefore assume an average 1.5 per cent growth rate of TVE employment from 2001 to 2010, to reach a total of 149 mllon by 2010.
Rural-urban migration is unlikely to grow faster in the near future, due to the weaker demand for, and oversupply of, unskilled labour in urban areas in recent years. In particular, a large number of urban workers in the state-owned enterprse sector have been lad off (SOE employment fell by 30 million from 1996 to 2000), and growth of export and domestic producton has slowed.
After the deduction of those who have been employed by TVEs and those who migrated to urban areas, nearly all the remaining rural labourers are n the agrcultural sector. Ths s because they are enttled to a small parcel of arable land under the current 'household responsibility system', whch provdes them wth a form of mnmum nsurance. Therefore Chna's agrcultural sector s n realty an enormous reservor of underemployed labour. Table 5 .1 shows the growth of the rural labour force, TVE employment and the estimated rural-urban migration during the 1980s and 1990s, and the expected growth of these varables n the 2000s. If we assume that the speed of the net transfer of agrcultural labour to the urban sector between 2001 and 2010 will be slightly slower than in the 1990s, that is, 3 million per year instead of 3.3 million per year, then the agricultural labour force in 2010 will be 304 million, a 40 million reduction from the 344 million in year 2000. In this case, and without further reduction in crop land, the labour intensity in the agricultural sector will fall by 12 per cent. Ths wll mean only a mnor mprovement n labour productvty and n per capta farmng ncomes.
More optimistically, if urbanisation can be significantly accelerated, with the rural-urban migrants doubling from 2001 to 2010, that is, an increase from 3.0 to 6.0 million per year, the agricultural labour force will be reduced to 274 mllon by 2010. Labour ntensty n agrculture wll declne by 20 per cent-still only a minor improvement in labour productivity. 
Imports, exports and prices of grain

Gran trade
In the 20 years from 1981 to 2000, there were net grain imports in 11 years and net exports n nne years. Total net mports were small compared to total output. From 1995 to 2000, average annual imports were 4.82 million tonnes but net mports were only 0.79 mllon tonnes per year. Annual gran mports have never reached the WTO tarff quota of 22.2 mllon tonnes durng the past half century. Only n 1995 were mports close to the quota (20.8 million tonnes), although as discussed below this level of imports caused a serious oversupply of grain. Table A5 .3 lists total imports and exports of grans and of some major gran products.
Gran prces
Before comparing domestic grain prices with those in world markets, a bref revew of the structure of the domestc market and changes n the setting of domestic prices since 1985 is in order. At the beginning of this period, domestic prices of grain (farm gate prices) took three forms: the state quota price, the state above-quota price, and the rural market price. The state purchase prices, especially the quota prices, were 7 per cent to 25 per cent lower than the rural market prices in 1985 and 19 per cent to 53 per cent lower in 1993 because the nomnal state purchase prces ncreased more slowly than market prces (see Tables A5 .4-A5.7). The state quota price in real terms, as a weighted average, decreased by 20.3 per cent from 1985 to 1993 (Table 5 .2). Due to supply shortages, the state progressively increased its quota or above-quota prices from 1994 to 1996. Market prices also increased in 1994 and 1995 because market supples were squeezed by the ncreased state purchases and increased state grain stocks. The highest domestic prices in real terms, as a combination of the state and market prices, were reached in 1996. According to an internal report, major grain prices exceeded world market prices by 38 per cent to 45 per cent at that time, except for rice which was 8 per cent lower.
In 1997, quota prices increased further even though market prices had started declnng n 1996. Ths led to quota prces exceedng market prces in 1997 and 1998. In 1997, real quota prices were 50.8 per cent higher than in 1993, and 20.2 per cent higher than in 1985. However, real market prices declined from a level 29 per cent higher than the 1985 prices to only 3 per cent higher than the 1985 prices between 1996 and 1997 (Table 5 .2).
The increases in grain prices over the 1994-97 period resulted in hstorcally hgh output levels above 500 mllon tonnes between 1996 and 1999. Together with the large grain imports in 1995 and 1996 (20.8 and 12 .2 million tonnes, respectively), this resulted in large domestic surpluses. As a result, the state purchase prices fell by 19 per cent from their highest levels in 1997 to the recent low of 2000, and the market price dropped by 43 per cent from its highest level in 1995 to a 15-year low in 2000. Table 5 .3 shows that in 2000 the real grain price, expressed as a weighted index of the state purchase prices and market prices, was 8 per cent lower than the 1985 level. By 2000 domestic prices of major grains had fallen to levels similar to, or even significantly lower than, world market prices.
Since 1998, the state quota and above-quota prices have been combined to form a support price, which was higher than market prices at the begnnng but by 2000 was smlar to market prces. Ths was because the decson makng about support prces has been decentralsed to the provincial or lower-level governments, and these governments cannot afford to subsdse gran prces.
Detailed discussion on the reasons for such large fluctuations in domestic market prices can be seen in Wang (2001) . Table 5 .3 provides a comparison of prces of major grans n rural markets between 1994 and 2000. It shows that the real prce of rce and wheat n 2000 were at levels equal to only 70 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively, of their 1994 levels. The 1994 prces were low compared wth those n 1995 and 1996.
There was a recovery n domestc gran prces n 2001. Up to September 2001, grain prices were 7.5 per cent above the levels of September 2000, and 5.7 per cent above the levels at the end of 2000 (Center for News Gathering and Editing, China Agricultural Web 2002). The recovery in prices has been mld snce the surplus of gran stock has not been fully absorbed. Total gran stocks were stll large at the end of 2001.
8 Therefore, a larger recovery in grain prices could be expected in the coming years-without a major increase in imports-before normal storage levels are reached.
One may conclude from the above description that either the 1995-96 domestic market prices or the 1997 quota price significantly exceeded an intermediate internal equilibrium level, whereas the 2000 domestic prices were far below that equilibrium. To compare with world prices, we may use the average domestc market prce level (n constant terms) durng the period of 1985-2000 to represent an intermediate internal equilibrium prce level. Ths average level s equal to 79 per cent of 1995 market prices and 137 per cent of 2000 market prices. It is 10 per cent higher than 1985 market prices. By accident, it is equal to the mean of market prices between 1995 and 2000.
We should note that the farm gate prces are not comparable wth world market prces for two reasons: the prce of mported gran wll be higher than world market prices after including transport, insurance and other costs; and to compare domestic prices with prices of imported grain, domestic purchase, transport and wholesale costs should be added.
It s reasonable to compare domestc wholesale prces and the mport CIF prices. Laping has found that the CIF prices of imported rice and wheat were significantly higher than the domestic wholesale prices from 1996 to 2000. In this comparison, however, there are a few important things we should note. First, the quality of exported, imported, and domestically wholesale grain may not be fully comparable. For example, imported rice and wheat is usually of a higher quality than the domestic grains. Second, f we compare the domestc wholesale prces of gran wth rural market prices or state purchase prices, the former were usually similar to, or even lower than, the latter. This was either a result of state subsidy in the earlier years or due to surpluses n the domestc market n recent years.
Historical data on quota, above-quota, rural market, wholesale, FOB and CIF prices for rice, wheat, corn and soybeans are presented in Tables A5.4-A5.7. They show that the rural market prices of wheat, corn and soybean were not significantly lower than the CIF or FOB prices, even in year 2000. Only the rice price is significantly lower than the CIF price. Gven consderaton of the qualty dfferences and the domestc costs for purchase, transport, storage and wholesaling, domestic prices of the major grains, except for rice, would still be higher than import prices. In Table 5 .4, the means of real market prices between 1995 and 2000 are compared with CIF prices. The comparison shows that, except for rice, between 1995 and 2000 the means of the rural market prces for major grains are all higher than the 2000 CIF prices. If the domestic costs of purchasing, transport and wholesale activities are added, the domestic prces would be even hgher.
In general, it is reasonable to accept the points of many Chinese experts who believe that only rice production has comparative advantage, albeit weak, in China, whereas all the other major grain products have either weak or strong comparative disadvantage. Even for rice, due to the quality differences between domestic and imported products, large imports are still possible in the intermediate term. Therefore, the WTO tariff quota wll have major mpacts on the domestc gran producton.
The direct impact of the WTO quota for grain imports
Major changes after WTO accession
There wll be several mportant changes n Chna's agrcultural polcy followng from ts WTO accesson commtments.
Chna adopts a tarff quota for total gran mports at a 1 per cent token tariff rate. The quota will be 18.31 million tonnes in 2002, 20.2 million tonnes in 2003, and increasing to 22.16 million tonnes in 2004 (Table 5 .5). According to the accession agreement, the 22.2 mllon tonnes of tarff quota s to be shared between the state and private trading enterprises, and all unused state quotas are to be transferred to prvate enterprses.
The above-quota tariff rates for the major grains will be 65 per cent, and for soybeans the tariff rate will be 3 per cent.
The average tarff rate for all agrcultural products to be reduced from 22 per cent to 17.5 per cent.
The average rate of domestc support for agrcultural products wll be zero. There wll be no export subsdes.
Other non-tariff restrictions on imports of agricultural products, such as licensing, are to be eliminated. This includes restrictions on imports of wheat from the north-west areas of North America, which may have TCK disease.
The economc mpact of the latter changes s not clear and the issues are strongly debated. More detailed information and analysis are needed. The above-quota tarff rate s not lkely to be mportant because experences wth gran mports show lttle lkelhood of gran mports exceeding the quota. In the following, the focus is on the impacts of the tariff quota on agricultural production, farmers' incomes, employment, and consumers. These mpacts appear to be the most mportant. The mpact of the elmnaton of domestc support for agrcultural products s also dscussed.
• Note: Rural food consumpton of gran s derved from household survey data. Feed grain is derived from livestock production data. The quantity of meat (pork, beef and lamb) s converted from the gross weght (wth bones) at a converson rato of 0.5. The weight conversion ratios between meat and feed grain are assumed to be 2.8 for meat production, 1.0 for poultry, eggs, cultured fish and shrimp, etc., and 0.3 for milk producton.
The feed consumpton of draught anmals was assumed to be 0.5 kg per anmal per day. The consumpton of seed gran was derved from the sown area of gran n year 2000 at an estmated average 0.15 tonnes per hectare. Self-consumpton ratos are the proportons of farmers' lvng or producton consumpton of gran that s provded by themselves as a percentage of ther total consumpton. They are based on the author's personal experence n varous rural surveys. Source: Calculated from statistical data on grain production, rural household grain consumption, livestock production, draught animals, grain sown area, rural population and household size in year 2000. The sze of the domestc gran market
To assess the mpact of the 22 mllon tonnes gran mport quota on the domestc gran market we need to calculate the sze of the domestc market. Total grain output was between 435 and 512 million tonnes (unprocessed grain) during the 1990s (462 million tonnes in 2000). However, the domestic market s far smaller than the total output because a substantal part of the gran output s consumed by farmers and does not enter the market.
In the 1990s, the state quota and above-quota purchases of grain were around 180 to 200 million tonnes per year (possibly higher in 1998-99); however, there are no statistics on the quantity of grain sold in the free market. The sze of Chna's domestc gran market (gran traded both by the state dealers and n the free market) may be approxmated from a calculaton of the volume of non-market gran consumed by farmers n 2000 (Tables 5.6 and 5.7).
In Table 5 .6, the estimated volume of non-traded grain (self-consumption) s shown as 255 mllon tonnes for the year 2000. The volume of traded 
The mpact on domestc gran prces
In estimating the impact of the WTO import quota on the domestic prices, we may consider two possible situations. First we may assume that the 22 mllon tonnes of gran mports s an external shock at a tme when the domestc market s n equlbrum. The domestc equlbrum prces are based on the calculaton n Table 5 .4 wth a 15 per cent ncrease to nclude the domestic purchase, transport and wholesale costs. In this situation, the wholesale prce of rce before the shock wll be 27 per cent lower than for mported rce (but the average qualty of domestc rce s also lower). Prices of wheat, corn and soybean before the shock will be higher than the imported prices by 24 per cent, 49 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively. In this situation, we may assume that the entire wheat and corn quotas, and 50 per cent of the rice quota, will be used. Altogether, these sum to 19.5 million tonnes. If we include other grains (for example, soybean imports may increase dramatically), total grain imports in 2004 could be above 21 million tonnes, that is, an increase of 18 million tonnes from an average 3.47 million tonnes between 1998 and 2000. This equals 9.6 per cent of the market demand and 4.4 per cent of total demand. (By the same calculation, imports will be around 17 million tonnes in 2002 and 19 million tonnes in 2003.) Gran consumpton n Chna s prce nelastc. Based on estmatons of China's grain demand elasticity in the literature, the author uses 0.37 as the weighted average elasticity of total demand for grain (alternatively, we could use 0.81 as the elasticity of market demand, which can be derived from the rato between total demand and market demand). 9 The prce effect of the 18 million tonnes of imports will lead to a 12 per cent decline of prces n the domestc market.
As an alternative situation (but more likely to be true), the external shock comes when the domestc market s still in surplus. In this case, the domestic prces of rce and wheat before the shock wll stll be lower than the mported prices, but that of corn and soybean is higher. Imports will be significantly smaller than in the first case. However, because the remaining quota can be used at any time when the domestic price is going up, the effects of imports will be similar to that in the first case, that is, they prevent the domestic price from recovering instead of pushing the price down. Therefore, for simplicity, only the first case is discussed in the following.
The mpact on domestc producton
How much grain production declines due to the price reductions will depend on the prce elastcty of supply. Accordng to the estmate by Wang (2001) , the total price elasticity of grain supply is 0.52, and the effect of prce changes on output wll be fully realsed wthn two years. Based on this elasticity, grain output will decline by 6.2 per cent in two years. There s lkely to be a 'cobweb effect' because the prce elastcty of demand is smaller than that of supply. In a standard 'cobweb effect' case, both production and price fluctuate to a larger and larger extent and can never converge to the equilibrium. However, this effect can be reduced by government operaton of a prce stablsaton scheme and mprovement n information services to grain producers. For simplicity, we may consider the case where, on average, the price level declines by 6 per cent and output falls by 3.1 per cent as an equilibrium result.
Producer losses
The producer losses can be approxmately derved from the followng formula (Prce before shock) x (percentage prce reducton) x (volume of market grain before shock -net imports) + (Output reduction) x (domestic price after shock) -(material input cost) + (fixed costs that cannot be reduced) -(net incomes from new jobs after shock).
Using the 2000 production and consumption data, we can calculate where 1,815 is the mean of 1995 and 2000 real grain price levels as a weighted average (constant yuan of 2000 per tonne), which is the assumed internal equilibrium price before shock, 6 per cent is the calculated price reduction due to the import shock, 215 is the calculated volume of market grain that is produced domestically before the shock, 3.1 per cent is the calculated reduction in total grain output, 40 per cent is the ratio of materal nput costs derved from the rato between gross output value and value-added of agriculture in 1998, 10 per cent is the assumed ratio of fixed costs to the reduced output, which cannot be proportionally reduced, and 30 per cent is the assumed proportion of farmers who can move to the non-gran sector n the short run and earn the same ncome as before.
In this calculation, farmers' self-consumed grain is excluded because it s offset by ther own producton.
The derived 28.0 billion yuan of net losses is equal to 0.31 per cent of GDP, or 2.0 per cent of the agricultural value-added in 2000, and 4.2 per cent of farmers' net ncome from farmng. Those gran farmers who have no other employment opportuntes would ncur a 9.1 per cent net ncome loss on average.
Producer losses could be much smaller if grain farmers can efficiently shift to non-grain production with the same resources available. However, the current stuaton s that the number of gran farmers (those fully or mainly engaged in grain production) is still very large, at least accounting for 60 per cent of the total 350 million farmers. Grain farmers are concentrated in the less developed central and west regions. Most of them have very low productivity, annually producing only 2 tonnes of grain per capita, and receive very low incomes. However, the transfer of these farmers to other sectors has been slow. The major obstacles are lmted employment opportuntes for unsklled labour n other sectors and the low level of educaton and sklls accessng domestc or nternatonal markets of non-gran products s difficult for many farmers due to poor information, telecommunication and transport servces n the remote rural areas the government has mposed gran producton quotas and provded price protection, and thus reduced farmers' incentives to move out of the gran sector. These polces have been gradually relaxed n recent years.
• •
•
Consumer gans
Consumer gans from ncreased mports can be approxmately calculated from the dfference n gran prces before and after the ncrease n mports times the market consumption of grain after the shock, as follows 1,815 x 6 per cent x 215 x (1 + 9.6 per cent -6.8 per cent) = 24.1 (billion yuan) where 9.6 per cent s the rato of mported gran to domestc gran before the import shock, and 6.8 per cent is the ratio of output reduction to the market grain before the shock. Again, the farmers' consumer gain from the prce changes s excluded for the reason mentoned earler. The 24.1 bllon yuan of consumer surplus s equal to 0.27 per cent of GDP, 0.52 per cent of total consumers' average income, or 0.83 per cent of urban resdents' ncome.
The mpact on employment
If we assume that the mported gran wll replace domestc producton and crowd out farmers without causing any decline in other farmers' income, then 4.4 per cent of the grain farmers, equal to 9.2 million, will lose jobs; although the ncrease n mports can only margnally ncrease employment opportuntes n the gran export countres due to ther far hgher labour productvty. Assumng that all these gran mports would come from the United States, for example, this would create only 40,000 new jobs in its farmng sector accordng to ts average productvty per capta.
The drect mpact of gran mports
The results show that the major sde effect of gran mports n the short term s not losses n value but the unbalanced dstrbuton of losses and gains (Table 5 .8). The costs directly impact low-income farmers, resulting n a relatvely large percentage declne of ther ncomes; whereas the benefits mainly goes to urban consumers who have a much higher income, and therefore accounts for only a small proporton of ther ncome. In addition, due to the inelastic adjustment, job losses will exert pressure on the economy n the years ahead. Gven that ths stuaton cannot be avoided, the key issue is how to accelerate the structural adjustment.
Structural adjustment
Adjustment of the agrcultural structure
To deal with the grain import shock, an adjustment that might be made s to change the proportons of grans accordng to Chna's comparatve advantage. Rce producton may be expanded to replace other grans. Some adjustment is already in process. Compared with the year 1995, the total area sown to grain had fallen by 4.5 per cent by 2000. Of this, the wheat area was down by 7.6 per cent whereas the rce area was only reduced by 2.5 per cent. Further adjustment can be expected. However, the capacity for further adjustment is limited because rice normally requires irrigation, whereas most of China's north areas, which mainly produce wheat, corn, soybean and other grains and not rice, are dry. Only the north-east provinces, that is, Liaoning, Jinlin and Heilongjiang, may have the potential to expand rce producton. A second way of adjustng s to replace gran wth other agrcultural products, for example, vegetables, cotton, oil-bearing crops, tea, fruits, etc.
The proportion of land area sown to grain to total sown area has fluctuated between 70 per cent and 80 per cent over the past 20 years, and fell to its lowest level of 69 per cent in 2000 due to low grain prices. In addition, the government has abolshed the gran producton quotas on the major gran mportng provnces n the coastal areas to provde more market for those provinces that have higher comparative advantage. Quotas to the major gran producng provnces have also been dropped because there s stll a surplus of gran supples. The formal abolton of the government quota system or prce protecton wll have a postve effect on the marketorented structural adjustment.
Export-oriented agriculture has had limited development in China, mainly in the coastal areas such as Guangdong. In 2000, exports of food and food animals were US$12.3 billion, accounting for only 4 per cent of the total value of output of Chna's agrcultural products. There are possbltes for further development of export-orented crops and anmal products. Future adjustment should be directed towards increased exports of labour-intensive products with low land intensity. However, a major effort is needed, especially for remote inland areas, to develop business connections with world markets, and also to develop related human resources, infrastructure and other facilities. These are long-run tasks, not only as a reaction to the import shock but also a way towards modernsaton of agrculture.
Removng prce protecton
Past experence ndcates that government protecton of gran prces has had a negatve mpact on farmers' ncomes because t has dstorted market prces and led to supply adjustment n the wrong drecton. Government gran prces set at levels hgher than market prces encourage farmers to produce grain in excess of market demand, eventually resulting in declines n market prces and surpluses of gran products. Ths has resulted n large fluctuations in grain prices and production in the past (see Wang 2001) , and adversely affected farmers' ncomes. Although currently prce protecton is not in place, under the WTO commitments of the government, price support s ruled out.
To replace the price protection and assist low-income farmers, more effective measures may be to improve information, technical, and training servces to farmers to help them to adjust ther producton and to shft to the more efficient production areas. In particular, more effort can be made to help farmers to find employment opportunities in non-grain and non-agrcultural sectors.
Industralsaton and urbansaton
A major structural adjustment that can be expected s the further transfer of agrcultural labour and other resources to the ndustral and servce sectors. The transfer of agricultural labour to the rural TVE sector and the urban sectors during the 1990s was 68 million; but this only reduced the agricultural labour force from 366 million to 344 million (see Table  5 .1). In the process there were only mnor ncreases n labour productvty and farmers' incomes, far slower than in the 1980s. Employment growth in TVEs stagnated in the late 1990s and rural-urban migration has also faced more resstance because urban unemployment has ncreased rapdly. According to past experience and the current situation, it is assumed that rural ndustralsaton and urbansaton wll together absorb 5.1 mllon rural labourers per year on average from 2001 to 2010, and on net reduce the agrcultural labour force by 4 mllon per year (Table 5 .1).
To absorb the grain import shock fully, at least an additional 6 million farmers should be employed by the TVE and urban sectors between 2002 and 2004 (assuming that 3.2 million will move to non-grain agricultural production during this period). This is obviously impossible. However, over a longer period, urbanisation could be accelerated via policy adjustments (ncludng removng the polcy bas aganst medum and large szed ctes) and mprovements n urban nfrastructure (Wang and Xa 1999) . Assumng that the speed of rural-urban migration can be doubled, an additional 30 mllon agrcultural workers would move to the urban sector between 2001 and 2010. In this case, the grain shock would be absorbed and there would be a larger mprovement n agrcultural productvty. Greater absorpton of the surplus agrcultural labour by the ndustral and servce sectors may lead to a net reducton of the number of farmers by another 100 mllon or more over the comng 20 years. 2 The definition of 'net income' is similar to 'disposable income'.
3 For references see for example, Sicular (1988) , Lin (1992 Lin ( , 1996 , Rozelle and Boisvert (1993) , Huang, Rosegrant and Rozelle (1998), and Wang (2000) .
4 This is according to official statistics. However, according to the 1996 national agricultural census data (and supported by satellite imaging data), in the past the cultivated land area was understated by 27 per cent in the official statistics (calculated from NBS 1999,
2001
). The same rato should also apply to sown areas. Adjustments are therefore made by the author in Tables A5.1 who were workng outsde ther home county and half of those who were workng outsde ther home town but wthn ther home county were n urban areas and were excluded from the TVE employment statistics. The changes from 1998 to 2000 were estimated according to the average growth rate of 'floating workers' from 1990 to 1998.
6 There were serous dscrepances between the 1990 data for the populaton and labour force, which were from the 1990 national census, and the data before and after 1990, 
